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Abstract
When Mt. Ruapehu erupted in 1995–1996 in New Zealand, a tephra
barrier was created alongside Crater Lake on the top of Mt. Ruapehu. This
barrier acted as a dam, with Crater Lake rising behind it over time. In 2007
the lake breached the dam and a lahar occurred down the Whangaehu
Valley and across the volcano’s broad alluvial ring-plain. Given the lahar
history from Ruapehu, the risk from the 2007 event was identiﬁed
beforehand and steps taken to reduce the risks to life and infrastructure.
An early warning system was set up to notify when the dam had broken
and the lahar had occurred. In combination with the warning system,
physical works to mitigate the risk were put in place. A planning group
was also formed and emergency management plans were put in place to
respond to the risk. To assess the effectiveness of planning for and
responding to the lahar, semi-structured interviews were undertaken with
personnel from key organisations both before and after the lahar event.
This chapter discusses the ﬁndings from the interviews in the context of
communication, and highlights how good communication contributed to
an effective emergency management response. As the potential for a lahar
was identiﬁable, approximately 10 years of lead-up time was available to
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install warning system hardware, implement physical mitigation measures,
create emergency management plans, and practice exercises for the lahar.
The planning and exercising developed effective internal communications,
engendered relationships, and moved individuals towards a shared mental
model of how a respond to the event. Consequently, the response played
out largely as planned with only minor communication issues occurring on
the day of the lahar. The minor communication issues were due to strong
personal connections leading to at least one incidence where the plan was
bypassed. Communication levels during the lahar event itself were also
different from that experienced in exercises, and in some instances
communication was seen to increase almost three-fold. This increase in
level of communication, led to some difﬁculty in getting through to the
main Incident Control Point. A ﬁnal thought regarding public commu-
nication prior to the event was that more effort could have been given to
developing and integrating public information about the lahar, to allow for
ease of understanding about the event and integration of information
across agencies.
Keywords
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1 Introduction
1.1 Background
In 1995 and 1996 Mt. Ruapehu in New Zealand
underwent a series of eruptions that initiated
approximately 30 eruption-induced lahars, and
several ash falls over parts of New Zealand’s
North Island (Galley et al. 2004; Cronin et al.
1997; Johnston et al. 1999). A tephra layer was
also deposited at the head of the Whangaehu
Valley on the Ruapehu Crater Lake outflow
channel, creating a natural dam to the lake
(Manville et al. 2007). Over time it was antici-
pated that the water in the Crater Lake would rise
behind the dam to a volume of 7–9 million cubic
metres, and eventually breach it, resulting in a
dam-break lahar (Keys and Green 2008). This
lahar would travel down the Whangaehu Valley,
and despite much of the area being quite remote,
people and infrastructure were potentially in
danger (Fig. 1). In addition to many lahars
caused by other factors (such as eruptions and
rain mobilisation; Keys and Green 2008), previ-
ous dam-break lahars are known to have occur-
red from Ruapehu, including a devastating lahar
in 1953. In that instance, the dam-break lahar
travelled down the valley and seriously damaged
a rail bridge at the location of Tangiwai (Board
of Inquiry 1954). Soon after, a passenger train
hurtled into the lahar-flooded Whangaehu River
and 151 people died. Given the consequences of
the 1953 event, and the anticipation that a new
dam-break lahar could occur, it was considered
imperative that something be done to reduce the
risk from a potential future event. Options
included removing the tephra dam through to
planning an emergency management response to
a break-out lahar. The dam-break lahar eventu-
ally occurred on 18 March 2007. This chapter
describes the mitigation and planning actions that
were taken to reduce the risk, and based on a
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series of interviews with those involved in the
planning process, outlines the role of communi-
cation in creating an effective response.
1.2 What to Do About an Anticipated
Lahar?
A number of studies were conducted to assess the
hazard and risk of a dam-break lahar at Ruapehu
(e.g., Hancox et al. 1997, 1998; Taig 2002) and
to identify options for reducing the risk (DOC
1999). While some strongly advocated for
intervention at the tephra dam, e.g., digging a
tunnel through the barrier to remove the potential
for catastrophic collapse (Hancox et al. 1997), it
was decided that no engineering intervention
should take place (Keys 2007b). Instead, a mix-
ture of warning systems, mitigation works and
emergency planning was instigated to deal with
the dam-break lahar issue (Keys and Green 2002,
2008; Norton 2002; Massey et al. 2009).
To mitigate the risk of a lahar, a ‘bund’ (levee)
was built in early 2002 at the spill-over point of
the Whangaehu River into the Waikato Stream
(Galley et al. 2004). The objective of this was to
stop a lahar from getting into the catchment of the
Tongariro River and thus protecting infrastructure
Fig. 1 Map of Mt. Ruapehu Crater Lake, showing potential lahar path, and locations of signiﬁcance (adapted from
Keys and Green 2008)
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(i.e. Tongariro Power Station) and people down-
stream. Other mitigation works included making
changes to infrastructure at risk from the lahar,
such as strengthening and raising the road bridge
at Tangiwai by two metres (Wakelin 2006).
At about the same time as the bund was built a
warning system called the Eastern Ruapehu
Lahar Warning System (ERLAWS) was set
up. ERLAWS (a system of sensors and preven-
tative mechanisms) was designed to sense
vibrations when the lahar had been triggered and
send electronic warnings out to people (e.g., via
pager, computers, electronic road signs), so that
emergency responders could initiate a response
(Keys 2009; Leonard et al. 2008; Wakelin 2006;
Massey et al. 2009). The system was expected to
give a maximum of one hour of warning of the
impending lahar at State Highway One (SH1) on
the Desert Road, and two hours warning at the
Tangiwai Bridge (Wakelin 2006).
While the ERLAWS in particular was a good
way of detecting when a Crater Lake lahar had
been triggered, the system was also subject to
being set off accidentally and creating a ‘false
alarm’. This could particularly occur when rain
storm events caused heightened stream flow.
An Eruption Detection warning System (EDS)
was also present on Ruapehu and provided an
additional avenue forwarning of lahars. The EDS is
triggered by earthquakes when an eruption of a
certain size occurs, allowingwarning for lahars that
are potentially generated by volcanic eruptions
(Leonard et al. 2008). Such lahars usually occur
from hot volcanic material falling on snow and
melting the snow to generate a lahar which could
then impact on the local ski ﬁelds. However, an
eruption could also potentially generate a Crater
Lake break-out lahar if a dam has blocked the lake,
and thus the EDS provided another warning option
for the dam-break lahar situation.
Another element of managing a Ruapehu
Crater Lake dam-break lahar was that of emer-
gency planning. It was decided that response
plans should be prepared to deal with a
dam-break lahar if, and when, it occurred (Keys
2009). The region affected by a potential lahar
was divided into two parts: a Northern part which
would only be affected if a lahar were to overtop
the bund and get into the Waikato Stream and
Tongariro River; and a Southern part which was
the main area that would be affected if a lahar
moved from Ruapehu Crater Lake via the
Whangaehu River to the sea. A Northern Rua-
pehu Lahar Planning Group and a Southern
Ruapehu Lahar Planning Group were formed to
develop plans on an effective response for before,
during and after a dam-break lahar event. Both
groups were convened by 2003 (Galley et al.
2004). The following section describes the nature
of the planning undertaken by these groups in the
anticipation of responding effectively to a lahar.
1.3 Planning a Response
to a Ruapehu Crater Lake
Lahar
Taupo District Council (TDC) took on primary
responsibility for developing the Northern
EmergencyManagement Plan, while the Ruapehu
District Council (RDC) took on primary respon-
sibility for the Southern Emergency Management
Plan. Development and reﬁnement of the plans
took place in collaboration with many other
organisations with responsibilities (Table 1), with
the ﬁnal sign-off occurring in 2004 for the
Northern Plan (Northern Lahar Planning Group
2004) and in 2005 for the Southern Plan (South-
ern Lahar Planning Group 2005).
A central Incident Control Point (ICP) in the
town of Ohakune was identiﬁed in the plan.
The ICP was where the majority of responders
would meet to coordinate response to the lahar.
There were also a number of agencies that would
operate remotely from other Emergency Opera-
tions Centres (EOCs) and from out in the ﬁeld
where the lahar was occurring.
The plans outlined the actions to be undertaken
before (relating to readiness for the event, and
reducing the risk), during (response phase) and
after (recovery phase) the lahar took place, and the
organisations responsible for those actions. As
part of the readiness and reduction phase, warning
levels numbered from 1 to 5 were assigned for
different levels of the Crater Lake (Table 2). These
warning levels were based on historic records of
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NZ Army X X • Provide staff and resources as required
Department of Conservation (DOC) X X • Respond to pager activation and notify
DOC staff
• Implement Tongariro National Park Lahar
response plan
• Provide advice on lahar status and
on-going support to emergency operations
centre (EOC)/Incident control point (ICP)
• Provide specialist personnel
• Follow own contingency plans
Environment Waikato (Regional
Council)
X • Activate group EOC
• Notify incident controller
• Provide regional liaison ofﬁcer to ICP
• Monitor situation
• Coordinate regional response as required
New Zealand Fire Service X X • Provide staff as required to ICP and
roadblocks
• Provide staff to assist with evacuations
Genesis Energy (Power company) X X • Follow own contingency plans
• Provide engineering advice to ICP
Good Health Wanganui (Wanganui
District Health Board (DHB))
X • Establish liaison with St John ambulance
• Implement plans
• Alert other District Health Boards
• Health advisor for EOC provided
• Health media liaison and spokesperson
• Casualty documentation process estimated
• Coordination with police
• DHB and St John develop transport plan
• DHB coordinating health response
Horizons Manawatu-Wanganui
(Regional Council), Lakes DHB,
Waikato DHB, Bay of Plenty DHB
X • Activate Group EOC
• Notify district councils, Incident
Controller, EOC staff, National Crisis
Management Centre (NCMC)
• Coordinate response across region
• Monitor situation and update NCMC
• Coordinate regional support
• SRLPG1
GNS Science (GNS-Earth science
research agency)
X • Notify police communications of lahar
status
• Monitor lahar status
• Provide advice to EOC
Justice Department X X • Respond to pager
Ministry of Civil Defence &
Emergency Management (MCDEM)
X X • Notify MCDEM staff
• Provide national liaison ofﬁcer to ICP
• Monitor situation
• Coordinate national response to lahar as
required
• SRLPG
Opus Consultants X X • Contractors for infrastructure assessment
(continued)







New Zealand Police X X • Staff road blocks
• Assist with evacuations
• Initiate Coordinated Incident Management
System (CIMS) structure2
• Activate ﬁre siren
• Provide staff to ICP/EOC
• Direct agencies as required
• Implement trafﬁc management plan
• Check on state of bund
• Contact transit to open road
• Initiate CIMS structure
• Provide staff to check river
• Coordinate the use of aerial assistance in
upper mountain and river areas to make
public safe
• Coordinate Search and Rescue personnel
• SRLPG
Rangitikei and Wanganui District
Council
X • Activate lahar response plan
• Advise local school
• Advise Chief Executive Ofﬁcer and
Roading Manager
• Commence telephone tree call out
• Provide staff as required
Ruapehu District Council (RDC) X X • Notify RDC staff
• Activate siren if not working
• Provide staff to EOC/ICP
• Initiate telephone tree calls
• Monitor RDC assets
• Advise recovery manager
• Maintain EOC
• Provide on-going info to EOC
• Bridge inspection
• Contact transit to open road
• SRLPG
Search and Rescue (SAR) X X • Activate if required
Taupo District Council (TDC) X • Establish EOC
• Monitor TDC assets
• Resource to the EOC as required
Transpower (Owns and operates
New Zealand’s electricity grid)
X X • Implement agency lahar response plan
• Implement Transpower contingency plan
• Monitor situation
• Provide engineering advice to EOC
Transit New Zealand3 (Responsible for
the New Zealand State Highway
network)
X X • Notify staff and contractors
• Activate agency lahar response plan
• Deploy contractors to snow huts
• Activate/check variable message signs
• Contractors to close snow gates
• Provide engineering advice to ICP
• Provide contractors to road blocks
• Engineering inspection of Transit assets
• Implement trafﬁc management plan
(continued)
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previous lahars and the damage they caused
(Galley et al. 2004). At Crater Lake Warning
Level 1, when the lake was at a low level, trained
staff were expected to be able to “initiate a
response” within 30 min (Northern Lahar Plan-
ning Group 2004; Southern Lahar PlanningGroup
2005). In contrast, at Warning Level 4, where the
lake level was higher, trained staff were expected
to initiate a response within 5 min. As well as
using the warning levels for the plan, public
information was also provided around the current
level of the lake andwhat this meant in terms of the
likelihood and risk of a lahar occurring (e.g.
leaflets, websites, free-phone) (Fig. 2).
For the response phase, the Plans outlined
actions that each organisation should take for time
periods following the activation of ERLAWS
(that is, after 5, 30, 60, and 90 min from when a
lahar warning had been triggered). For example,
in the ﬁrst 5 min following ERLAWS activation
and pager receipt, common activities that agen-
cies listed in the Plans had to do included
responding to the pager, and contacting relevant
internal and external personnel to notify them of
the activation so they could start responding.
Within 30 min, Incident Control Points were
required to be set up, the Coordinated Incident
Management System (CIMS) structure initiated,
road blocks established, lahar visually conﬁrmed
(if possible), key contacts and communication
established (with any required information flow-
ing), and individual agency contingency plans
implemented. Sixty minutes after the lahar
warning was received, much of the response was
expected to be in ‘monitoring and maintenance
mode’, where agencies were watching the pro-
gress of the lahar, staff were kept at key points as
required (or deployed elsewhere if needed), and
communication over the state of affairs was
continuing. After 90 min the watching brief was
expected to continue, and response was then to
move toward the recovery phase.
After an ofﬁcial commencement of the recov-
ery phase, the plans outlined the need for brief-
ings, implementation of trafﬁc management
plans, provision of staff as required, engineering
inspections of key infrastructure, and coordina-
tion of media and communication. These activi-
ties and monitoring of the situation continued for
two hours, after which it was expected that








Tranz Rail/Ontrack4 (rail network
maintainer and operator)
X X • Notify Police communications of activation
of Tranz Rail lahar warning system
• Cease train trafﬁc
• Isolate power at Tangiwai rail bridge and
rail crossing
• Activate agency lahar response plan
• Provide advice to ICP as required
• All train trafﬁc to remain stopped until
directed by Incident Controller
Winstone Pulp International (local
business in the lahar path)
X • Implement lahar response plan
• Alert personnel and evacuate ‘at risk sites’
• Advise ICP when evacuation complete
Works Consultancy X • Contractors for infrastructure assessment
Adapted from Galley et al. (2004), Northern Lahar Planning Group (2004), Southern Lahar Planning Group (2005)
1SRLPG agencies speciﬁcally named as part of the Southern Group in the group plan
2CIMS is a scalable command and control structure widely used in emergency management in New Zealand and in
many other countries under various incident management or coordination system names
3From 2008 Transit New Zealand has been operating as the New Zealand Transport Agency
4From 1995 the organisation responsible for maintaining New Zealand’s rail network was named Tranz Rail. The name
was changed to Ontrack in 2004. Since 2008 the rail network has operated under the new name of KiwiRail
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The Plans also included procedures for false
alarms generated by ERLAWS. Only the Inci-
dent Controller could declare a false alarm based
on either expert advice from the Duty Scientist
monitoring the lahar, visual conﬁrmation that
there was no lahar, or if the time estimated for the
lahar to reach Tangiwai had passed (Northern
Lahar Planning Group 2004; Southern Lahar
Planning Group 2005). False alarms provided
the opportunity to practice for an effective
response.
Individual agencies also developed their own
emergency management plans (e.g. the Central
District Police Lahar Response Plan), which
were consistent with both the Northern and
Southern Plans.






% Explanation Actions Indicative time for lake to rise to
next alert Level in summer
Normal Below
2527





Level 1 2526.5 95 Critical trigger point, 3 m below the new
rock overflow level. Waves caused by
eruptions and small landslides could
overtop barrier but the probability of a
small collapse lahar caused by a resulting









Level 1b 2529.5 100 Lake full to the buried rock rim outlet
level and the base of the tephra dam.
Probability of barrier failure at this level is
still very low
1–6 months to ﬁll from Alert
Level 1b to 2
Level 2 2533 108 Sudden collapse could produce a lahar
equivalent to the 1975 event. This is the
largest historic lahar that has passed
under the Tangiwai bridges (without
causing damage) and down the Tongariro
River
Conditional probability of barrier failure
at this level is 1–2%
Response
within 20 min
0.7–1.9 months to ﬁll from
Level 2 to 3, or 7.8 months to
drop down to Level 2 from Level
3, depending on inﬁll rates.
This large variation is due to the
possibility of the ﬁlling spanning
fast and slow ﬁlling rates, and
seepage. Slow ﬁll rates will
probably result in net drops in
lake level above about 2532 m
Level 3 2535 113 Equivalent to a large moderately fast
lahar. Conditional probability of barrier
failure at this level is 5–10%
Response
within 10 min
0.4–0.6 months to ﬁll from level
3 to 3b, or 3.2 months to drop
down to level 3 from 3b
Level 3b 2536 115 Conditional probability is 50–60% 0.2–0.3 months to ﬁll from level
3b to 4, or 1.1 months to drop
down to level 3b from 4
Level 4 2536.5 116 Equivalent to a large, fast lahar.
Conditional probability is 90%
Response
within 5 min
0.2–0.3 months to ﬁll from level
4 to 5, or 0.7 months to drop
down to level 4 from level 5
Level 5 2536.9 117 Lake at top of the tephra dam. Conditional
probability is 100%
Warning levels were associated with actions in the Northern and Southern Emergency Management Plans. Warning levels were
also used to communicate to the public about the height of the lake in relation to the tephra dam and crater rim, and the rate at
which the lake was ﬁlling with water (from Galley et al. 2004; Massey et al. 2009)
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A key part of planning for the lahar included
practicing the response using the Plans. A train-
ing and exercise schedule was devised and
included in the Plans. Some practice was also
obtained when ERLAWS was activated acci-
dentally (e.g. by bad weather) or when the EDS
detected a small volcanic eruption was in pro-
gress in 2006 (Mordret et al. 2010). In this
instance, responders received a message on their
pagers saying that a “LAHAR [was] POSSI-
BLE”, and they then knew they needed to start
the process of stepping up to respond to a
potential event.
1.4 Communication
Communication related to the lahar event needed
to be considered in three distinct contexts. First,
internal communication needed to occur between
those involved in planning for and responding to
the lahar. Inter- and intra-agency communication
about the lahar issue developed over a period of
10 years from the occurrence of the 1995–1996
Ruapehu eruptions through to the 2007 lahar. At
ﬁrst, communication was constrained by issues
including awareness of the historic Tangiwai
disaster; the range and desirability of options
available to treat the lahar risk, and differences in
opinion over how that risk should be managed
(DOC 1999; Keys 2009); a strong desire from
local iwi to let the lahar occur as a natural pro-
cess; politics over who should be planning for
and responding to the risk (Dittmer 2008; Keys
2009); and the quality of initial emergency plans
created by RDC for responding to the lahar
(Dittmer 2008). Such conflicts raised issues for
effective communication around planning.
Agencies often disagreed about the best approach
to take, and who should be taking it.
The Minister of Conservation made a ﬁnal
decision about management of the lahar in 2001,
guided by the Assessment of Environmental
Effects report which outlined various treatment
options (DOC 1999) and the debate which had
occurred around the issue. The Minister’s deci-
sion included the establishment of a physical
warning system and building of a bund, com-
bined with emergency planning (Dempsey
2002). Once the decision was made, a clear path
was deﬁned for the context in which future
communication would take place. From this
point onwards, inter and intra-agency communi-
cation developed as emergency management
planning for the lahar evolved.
The second primary communication area was
the external communication of public informa-
tion about the status of the Crater Lake levels and
response to the lahar event. A Lahar Information
Management group, comprising the lead agen-
cies in management of the event, was set up to
address media communications related to the
Fig. 2 Public information about the current level of the
lake (e.g. for May 2004) and what this meant in terms of
the likelihood and risk of a lahar occurring (replicated
from a leaflet provided by the Wanganui-Rangitikei
Emergency Management Committee 2004)
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lahar (Southern Lahar Planning Group 2005).
A lahar information plan, outlining management
of information before, during and after the lahar,
was included as part of the main Southern
Emergency Management Plan appendices.
The third area of communication related to
technical capacity. An effective response to the
lahar relied on technical support, the primary one
being timely communication about an impending
lahar by ERLAWS. Other aspects of technical
importance included the hardware required to
report to others verbally and visually about the
nature and progress of the lahar. It was impera-
tive that these technical aspects were able to
operate when the lahar occurred so that respon-
ders could communicate effectively.
The organisations involved in the planning
process came from different geographic and
functional jurisdictions (Leonard et al. 2005).
Many agencies had not worked together in the
past. This meant that diverse world views and
expectations were likely to exist amongst
responders, and there was a need to construct a
shared mental model over response and com-
munications (Paton et al. 1999). Galley et al.
(2004) conducted an analysis of the planning
process up to 2003 and made some observations
on a variety of issues, many of which pertained
to communication. They suggested that clariﬁ-
cation of communication roles, lines of commu-
nication, and methods of communication should
be undertaken to assist with creating a shared
mental model. They recommended improving
internal communication by continuing to conduct
multi-organisation planning meetings, education,
training and exercises. There was a need to
ensure the technical ERLAWS system was
robust and had adequate ‘check-back systems’.
Methods were also required for updating new
information into plans and processes.
2 The Lahar Event
On Sunday 18 March 2007, after a prolonged
period of wet weather, the tephra barrier began to
breach (Massey et al. 2009). Around 10:06 on
Sunday morning slumping started to occur at the
Crater Lake tephra dam. By 11:20 the dam was
fully breached by rising lake levels due to heavy
rainfall, and a lahar was flowing down the
Whangaehu Valley. Although the volume of
water was high, water was released in pulses over
a 45 min period, and the event was considered
‘moderate’ in size (Wakelin 2007).
The ERLAWS sensor at site 1 on the dam (see
Fig. 1) signalled a possible lahar just after 10:00
that morning. Between 10:06 and 11:42 all three
ERLAWS sensors (Sites 1–3) and the Genesis
sensor (Site 4) were triggered as the lahar trav-
elled down the Valley. The alarms sent data to
Tokananu Power Station and warning messages
to police, rail and road authorities, and to infras-
tructure agencies. Alarms also initiated the clo-
sure of automatic barrier arms and flashing lights
and signs on the State Highways (Keys 2007a).
By 11:00 am the Ohakune Incident Control
Point (ICP) was activated, and responders had
gathered at the ICP. Police had stopped rail trafﬁc
at Waiouru, farmers downstream were notiﬁed of
the lahar, and signs and road blocks on State
Highway 1 and State Highway 49 (SH49) were in
place. At 11:28 the Whangaehu Valley telephone
tree was activated, notifying valley residents of an
impending lahar. By 11:35 the DOC lahar duty
staff and response plan were activated and media
releases were being prepared (Keys 2007a).
By around 11:44 the lahar had reached the
bund built to prevent overflow from the lahar into
the Tongariro River, but did not breach it. By
11:50 a helicopter had taken response staff to the
area for visual conﬁrmation of the lahar but bad
weather and visibility kept observers from
viewing the Crater Lake (Wakelin 2007).
From 11:50 to 15:30 other personnel who had
not received the initial alerts were notiﬁed of the
lahar including the Minister of Conservation,
additional DoC staff, GNS research scientists,
infrastructure providers and the media (Keys
2007a). During the day of the lahar event, over
100 media calls were taken by ICP staff. Lahar
updates from the Emergency Operations Centre
and the Ruapehu Area Manager fed information
into media releases which were given to media as
per the Emergency Management Plans’ proce-
dures (Wakelin 2007).
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The lahar reached Tangawai Rail Bridge and
peaked at 13:30 and by 15:48 the warning lights
on SH1 were turned off and the highway reo-
pened. SH 49 was reopened at 16:06 and the
Ohakune Incident Control Point was closed at
18:18 as the lahar passed down the lower Whan-
gaehu River on its way to the sea (Keys 2007a).
By the end of the day on 18 March the lahar and
the emergency management response had run its
course, with no major incidents occurring.
3 Method for Communication
Research
As a Crater Lake tephra dam breach could be
anticipated beforehand, it provided an excellent
opportunity to study communication aspects of
the planned emergency response prior to the
lahar, and compare that with what happened in
an actual event. Twenty interviews were under-
taken between March and May 2006 with indi-
viduals from organisations involved in the
response to the event. The interviews were
semi-structured and contained questions about
participants’ organisations’ plans for the wider
response (including response to the ERLAWS
warning system, roles and responsibilities,
information management, communication, and
training) and their expectations for responding to
a lahar event. The interviews were repeated
between April and June 2007, after the lahar had
taken place. The same questions were asked, but
this time participants were asked to reflect on
how the actual response had gone compared with
the anticipated response. All interviews were
digitally taped and transcribed, and entered into
the software package ATLAS.ti. Coding of the
interviews was undertaken and key themes were
extracted as described by Braun and Clarke
(2006). The themes are organised under the fol-
lowing headings, which were identiﬁed as
important in the discussion above:




4 Results and Discussion:
Communication for the Lahar
Event
The following section discusses the key themes
related to communication that were identiﬁed
during analysis of the data.
4.1 Internal Communication
4.1.1 Internal Communication During
the Planning Process
Two types of internal communication were
identiﬁed from the interviews. The ﬁrst related to
internal communication during the planning
process. It included communication between
agencies as the planning process took place, as
well as communication within agencies. When
the ﬁrst set of interviews was undertaken in 2006,
participants reported that communication during
the planning process had been good. This is likely
due to the 10-year timeframe it had taken for
communication to develop. Tasks such as plan
development, meetings, training, exercising and
practices all contributed to better communication
between agencies over time. These tasks con-
tributed twofold: they helped build relationships
between personnel; and they helped develop
agreement over roles, responsibilities, and pro-
tocols for responding to the lahar, which could
subsequently be embedded in a plan. An inter-
viewee from Ontrack (responsible for the rail
network) reflected on how communication had
improved over time, based on the activities and
training that people had undertaken together:
We’ve got better at communicating in the last three
or four years. We use text messaging and confer-
encing a lot more and so we are actually going,
shifting more to CIMS models now than the ad hoc
system we used to work, because we all did CIMS
training last year and so we therefore tend to work
to a CIMS model.
On discussion about planning for future haz-
ard events, an interviewee from the Police noted
how relationships had been built and communi-
cation had improved, which would be useful for
the future:
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I think what we would [use from the lahar plan-
ning] is communications with people like [GNS
Science], DOC, Horizons, some of those relation-
ships will last a long time …and actually put us in
good stead…in years to come.
People’s expectations in 2006 of how com-
munication would occur during a future lahar
event seemed to predominantly correspond with
the details in the plans that had been developed.
Interviewees noted that communications,
including roles and contact information, were
“all laid out” in the plan (as quoted by one DOC
interviewee). People’s knowledge showed that
those involved in the future response had a good
understanding of how communication was likely
to unfold, and their roles and responsibilities.
Two people did anticipate that communication
during an actual response may go wider than
what the plan detailed, and suspected that some
people may approach them personally to seek
information.
Interviewees commented on the challenge of
keeping momentum and interest in the planning
process in the lead up to the lahar, due to the long
time frame. As one interviewee from Genesis
stated, “…it is just a challenge of keeping that
[focus] going”. They noted the need to keep
information updated and circulated to internal
staff and external responders so that people knew
the status of the Crater Lake and any new readi-
ness or response procedures that were put in place.
4.1.2 Internal Communication During
the Response
The second type of internal communication
related to anticipated and actual communication
during the response. In general, according to all of
the interviewees communication during the
response worked well. People followed proce-
dures that had been agreed upon, written down,
and practiced. The relationships that had been
developed were found to have largely assisted
with response-related communication. People had
noted prior to the lahar in 2006 that they some-
times had difﬁculty in getting hold of others
during exercises, but that by following the pro-
tocols set down in the plans they were able to
make contact with an alternate person.
There were a few instances where a break-
down in communication protocols occurred. In
one instance, this was due to the relationships
that had been developed during the planning
process. Such a strong set of relationships were
formed that one of the actions regarding conﬁr-
mation of lahar activation in the planned
response was undertaken out of sequence. A call
was made by a key responder to another agency
to conﬁrm the lahar had occurred, but this person
was not ofﬁcially supposed to do it. Given the
occurrence of this out-of-sequence action, the
response was delayed slightly until the proper
process was reinstated and the response moved
forward as per the plan.
Additionally, some participants had expecta-
tions that they would receive calls from one of
the primary responders to conﬁrm the lahar
activation (even though the plan had not outlined
this as an action), but this was not the case. This
created a period of anxiety and uncertainty as
agencies waited for the ofﬁcial word to reach
them that a lahar had indeed occurred.
Interviewees reported that multiple and
diverse technical sources of communication
during the response were useful, as both primary
modes of communication, and as a back-up.
Types of communication documented in both the
Northern and Southern Emergency Management
Plans included VHF radio, radio telephone (RT),
landline and mobile telephones (for regular
communications, telephone trees to notify local
residents of the lahar, etc.), satellite phone, fax
(e.g., for situation reports), email, conference
calling, and web-cameras showing the river.
Participants reported ﬁnding a common radio
connection useful in aiding connections, as
multiple people could sit in and listen on the
channel for updates. For instance, in 2006 the
Emergency Manager from Taupo District spoke
about how they could “turn on our radios and do
a listening brief because we can tune into DOC’s
radios, we can tune into the police radios and just
see what’s going on”. A particular point was also
made about the usefulness of having visual
information through pictures and video footage
of the lahar for understanding of how the event
was progressing, and for having a common point
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of discussion between agencies that may not be
sitting in the same room, but were able to see the
same imagery. An emergency manager from
Horizons Regional Council reflected on this
point by saying:
I think one of the biggest things, from a manage-
ment point of view, was the webcam. That was a
huge bonus. In fact, far more useful than I had ever
expected it to be. I was talking on the phone to […]
the National Controller, and we were just chatting
about how things were going and what information
we were getting and all that sort of carry on and I
said “We’re projecting our webcam image up onto
the wall” and he said “Yeah, we’re doing the
same.” Which is good. That’s what it was there for
and we were making sure that the page was
refreshing itself regularly and then [the National
Controller] said, “Oh, refresh your page.” So we
refreshed the page and it had gone from the base of
the tower to being over the top of the tower within
a few minutes and immediately we knew what was
going on, the guys in Wellington knew what was
going on, we knew roughly how big it was, and
from a management point of view that was really
beneﬁcial, being able to see it…
The Horizons participant also remarked that
methods of communication such as radio, tele-
conferencing and web-cam were useful for
understanding how the event was progressing in
“real-time” and that the response needed to
evolve to match its progress.
Videoconferencing between the different
agencies was not undertaken for this event, but it
was noted that for future events
video-conferencing would be useful and might
add an additional aspect to the response. As a
Horizons emergency manager stated, “you look
into a room and immediately get a feel for how
things are going”.
One of the ‘surprises’ faced by responders
was that the amount of communication differed
during the actual 2007 lahar event in comparison
with the exercises and practices. An interviewee
from the Police suggested that communications
were of greater number during the event itself
—“they tripled”—and that he was called by a
variety of people both from ofﬁcial agencies
(e.g., other Police, Ohakune ICP, Genesis), and
unofﬁcial sources (e.g., the public ringing to
enquire about trafﬁc disruption on SH1). The
emergency manager from Wanganui District also
said that his cell phone range constantly from
agencies who rang him personally. The increase
in communication also relates to the fact that
relationships were so good between responders,
that they would make contact with each other to
ﬁnd out more information, even if it wasn’t
speciﬁcally part of the plan. Conversely, one
DOC interviewee located in the ICP said that she
did “very little communication, because every-
one had everything under control”.
Frequent updates of information were praised
by responders, who found the frequency useful
for understanding what was going on, and
responding. An interviewee from Ontrack gives
one example of this:
The NCM [Network Control Manager] sent text
messages out in a real timely manner right through
the whole event. It was really good. You didn’t
actually have to ring the Network Control Manager
up because the text messages were coming oh,
round about every thirty to forty minutes […]
telling you what’s going on.
4.2 External Communication
4.2.1 Communication of Public
Information Prior
to the Lahar
Prior to the lahar occurring information was
provided to the public about the potential lahar
and its management. Media interest was high,
demonstrated by a number of stories on varying
aspects of the lahar (Dittmer 2008). While there
was a good effort made to provide timely, rele-
vant and clear information about the potential
lahar, sometimes confusion surrounded the
information that was presented. The planning
group attempted to be proactive in addressing
confusion.
For example, some participants perceived that
there was confusion amongst the public about the
information provided on the warning levels for
the lahar, and that more explanation was
required. Additionally, as the warning levels
changed (i.e. from 1 to 2) messages required
updating and clariﬁcation. The Horizons
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emergency manager explained that in response to
these communication needs, the 0800-freephone
message was re-written to outline the current
level of the lake, the likelihood and risk of the
lahar occurring, and stated some actions that
people should do. Messages for subsequent
warning levels were prepared in advance in case
they needed to change at short notice.
Interviewees also reported public confusion
around some of the messages that were used on
the lahar signs placed on SH1 to warn travellers
about the potential for a lahar to occur. The
Police noted that people did not understand the
word ‘lahar’ that was used on the signs, so the
terminology was changed to ‘flash flooding’
instead.
It was suggested by one of the interviewees
that while the Lahar Information Group was
active in both the readiness and the response
phases, it could have directed more of its efforts
to providing public information during the
readiness phase. This would have allowed the
provision of public information prior to the
event, and efforts to provide information by
various agencies (e.g., DOC, GNS Science,
MCDEM, Horizons, etc.) could have been more
integrated. It was suggested by one participant
that a speciﬁc pre-lahar communication plan
could have been developed to assist in readiness
education.
4.2.2 Communication of Public
Information During
Response to the Lahar
Provision of public information about the lahar
during the lahar response was generally effective,
likely due to the pre-planning that had occurred
to coordinate a media response. There was some
discussion following the response that some of
the media releases were a bit slow to be produced
and disseminated to the public. This was thought
to be because the person in charge of the media
releases was unable to get to the ICP quickly, and
another staff member was required to take over
issuing media releases. A DOC interviewee
suggested that the delay was related to the person
who took over the media releases being
“swamped” or overloaded with work and that it
was a “stafﬁng-level thing”.
4.3 Technical Capacity
Prior to the Ruapehu lahar, interviewees pre-
dominantly reported that they had worked to
develop a robust and integrated technical system
of communication. ERLAWS needed to be reli-
able, and report as few false alarms as possible.
For the most part this was the case, and it was
estimated that there was one false activation per
month (pers. comm. Keys 2007c). For the false
alarms that did occur, protocols were put in place
to identify the false alarm and shut down the
response. These procedures were agreed on in the
Plans, and practiced by the responders. If false
alarms started to become too frequent, (e.g., in
April 2006 there were four in one month) this
was reviewed and new procedures put in place
(pers. comm. Keys 2007c).
It was deemed essential that ERLAWS was
linked into response systems of multiple organi-
sations. It was also important that organisations
were able to communicate together on compati-
ble equipment. An Ontrack employee described
how they ensured that the ERLAWS system was
consistent with the other systems the Railways
used to keep people safe. In another example, an
interviewee from Genesis (2006) remarked:
All DOC ERLAWS systems go through […] the
Genesis handling systems because we have all the
communications that work on the mountain, so it
made sense to do that. So obviously, we work
really closely with DOC to make sure that their
ERLAWS systems which run through ours are
robust…
Technical communications worked well on
the day of the lahar. ERLAWS was activated as
expected, and everyone was able to communicate
via the various technical means outlined in the
planning and used in the exercises. There were
only a couple of reports of responders having
difﬁculty getting through to the ICP. These were
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mostly related to “black spots” in the operation
of equipment (i.e. remote areas where equipment
could not pick up signals), and the fact that the
networks were busy. For example, a participant
from Ontrack describes their communication
difﬁculties with the ICP:
Initially, we had some problems trying to get
through to the ICP centre at Ohakune. However,
when we did get through they were really good.
They gave us a cell phone number to get round the
telephone numbers and I suggested to the Network
Control Manager next time it happens, we’ve got a
fax number for them, fax them instead of a fax
saying ‘please ring’ and to make the contact,
because it’s important that we make that link.
This demonstrates how communication issues
were solved by users being able to use different
modes of communication to get around the
problem, highlighting the importance of multiple
modes of communication.
5 Conclusions
This chapter has provided a summary of the organ-
isational communication that occurred before, dur-
ing and after the 2007 Ruapehu Crater Lake
break-out lahar. It is evident that effective commu-
nication before and during an event, can assist an
effective response. The Ruapehu Crater Lake lahar
had approximately 10 years of lead-in time before
the event occurred. During this time, agencies were
able to agreeonan approach tomanage the lahar risk,
develop a technical warning system, implement
mitigation measures, start a planning process,
develop plans, hold exercises, and practice
responding to false alarms. Being involved in many
of these activities helpedbuild a sharedmentalmodel
of howa diverse collection of agencieswere going to
respond to the lahar (Galley et al. 2004; Paton et al.
1999). Exercises and practices also contributed to
testing whether technical aspects of the warning
system were robust, and allowing changes to be
made to plans when necessary. The on-going com-
munication and cooperation between agencies
developed robust relationships that enabledpeople to
work together in an effective manner. Given these
conditions, the eventual response to the 2007 lahar
was very effective, and communication reportedly
worked well.
Only a few minor communication issues were
reported.
• First, it was suggested that more effort could
have been given to developing and integrat-
ing public information about the lahar prior to
the event.
• Second, a number of participants in the study
reported having trouble getting through to the
ICP due to communications being very busy,
but this problem was averted by responders
making use of the diversity of communication
modes and networks to ﬁnd alternative paths
to the ICP.
• Third, it was identiﬁed that communication
levels during the lahar event itself were dif-
ferent from exercises or practices, and in
some instances communication was seen to
increase almost three-fold. This phenomenon
should be highlighted for those planning for
future events so that they have realistic
expectations of what a response will be like.
• Finally, the development of relationships was
extremely important in facilitating communi-
cation, planning, and an effective response.
However, this produced some downfalls. Per-
sonal relationships affected the response, with
at least one person bypassing communications
actions in the plan in favour of communicating
with someone else not noted in the plan,
resulting in a brief communication breakdown.
This minor issue should also be considered
when undertaking planning for future events.
The ﬁndings from this research on the 2007
Ruapehu lahar support current literature on good
practice for effective warnings. Leonard et al.
(2008) suggest that there are 5 key components
of an effective warning system including:
1. Early warning system hardware
2. Planning
3. Co-operation, discussions, and communication
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4. Education and participation
5. Exercises.
These ﬁve components are supported and
informed by ‘Research and science advice’ and
‘Effectiveness evaluation’. Although this chapter
has focused on the key role of Co-operation,
discussions and communication, it is evident that
the actual response to the Ruapehu lahar contains
most of the elements required for a warning to be
effective. More development could perhaps have
been undertaken in the areas of ‘Education and
participation’ and ‘Effectiveness evaluation, but
other areas were robustly handled. This may
explain why the response to the Ruapehu lahar
was very effective.
The 2007 Ruapehu lahar was a unique event in
that the nature of a potential future lahar could be
reasonably well anticipated. The Crater Lake took
over 10 years to ﬁll to the point where the lahar
occurred, which allowed a long lead in time to
build relationships and plan for a response. Not
every event will have the luxury of such a lead in
time and therefore it is even more imperative that
relationship-building, planning and communica-
tion takes place before events occur, to allow for
an effective response. With respect to future
events from Ruapehu and the nearby Central
North Island volcanoes, the Central Plateau Vol-
canic Advisory Group has since been established
for this purpose. Meeting two to three times per
year, scientists, Civil Defence & Emergency
Management personnel, planners, communica-
tors, emergency services and local community
representatives discuss plans for the volcanoes of
Ruapehu, Ngauruhoe and Tongariro, and build
relationships. This structure is likely to have
helped in the response to the eruptions of Ton-
gariro in 2012.
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